In addition, connecting to an HTTP server using SPNEGO usually involves keeping the underlying connection alive and reusing it for further requests to the same server. When connecting to an HTTP server that uses SPNEGO to negotiate authentication, and when connection and authentication with the server is successful, the authentication information will then be cached and reused for further connections to the same server. Caching for HTTP SPNEGO connections remains enabled by default, so if the property is not explicitly specified, there will be no behavior change. A new JDK implementation specific system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO (Negotiate/Kerberos) connections is introduced. New system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO connection: Running "jarsigner -verify" on a JAR file signed with a weak algorithm or key will print more information about the disabled algorithm or key. To check if a weak algorithm or key was used to sign a JAR file, one can use the jarsigner binary that ships with this JDK. This property contains a list of disabled algorithms and key sizes for cryptographically signed JAR files. The list of disabled algorithms is controlled via the security property,, in the curity file. Standalone or Server Applications that are run with a SecurityManager enabled and are configured with a policy file that grants permissions based on the code signer(s) of the JAR file. This can potentially occur in the following types of applications that use signed JAR files: If the signed JAR file uses MD5, signature verification operations will ignore the signature and treat the JAR as if it were unsigned. This JDK release introduces a new restriction on how MD5 signed JAR files are verified.
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